The Supreme Court issued rulings in four cases this morning.
McGuire v. Bates, No. 82659-5 (briefs and argument) – Read those settlement agreements carefully, folks. The Supreme Court rules that a settlement for “all claims” precluded the prevailing party from recovering attorneys fees in addition to the settlement payment. Julianne McGuire hired Robert Bates to remodel her kitchen. After it was done, she claimed that he had done the work improperly and sued him. The case went to mandatory arbitration, but before the arbitration the parties settled “all claims” for $2,180. RCW 18.27.040 allows the prevailing party in a suit by a homeowner against a contractor to recover attorney fees. McGuire moved for attorney fees based on this statute. The arbitrator denied the motion because the parties had agreed to settle “all claims.” However, the courts held that attorney fees are a cost, not a claim, and were thus not included in the settlement agreement. Bates appealed, and also argues that McGuire is not a “prevailing party” because the case was settled. The Court of Appeals held the attorneys fees could be added to the settlement total, but the Supreme Court reversed, with Justice Gerry Alexander writing the unanimous opinion.
State v. Afana, No. 82600-5 (briefs and argument) – The Court rules that a police officer’s search of a vehicle after the arrest of the passenger was unconstitutional. Mark Afana was sitting in his legally-parked car with a friend, Jennifer Bergeron, watching a DVD on a portable player. A police officer approached them, asked what they were doing, and requested ID. The officer discovered a warrant against Bergeron and arrested her. In a search incident to the arrest the officer found drugs in the car. At Afana’s trial, the court held that the request for ID was an illegal stop and suppressed the drug evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the request for ID was mere social contact. The Supreme Court, with Justice Alexander writing, held the warrantless search of the car was unconstitutional under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution: “a warrantless search of an automobile is permissible under the search incident to arrest exception only when that search is necessary to preserve officer safety or prevent destruction or concealment of evidence of the crime of arrest.”
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State v. Bashaw, No. 81633-6 (briefs and argument) – Bertha Bashaw was convicted of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. Because the offenses occurred within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop, her maximum sentence was doubled by statute. Bashaw argues that distance measurements of a mechanical device were improperly admitted because the State failed to demonstrate that the device functioned reliably. She also contends that the jury instructions incorrectly required unanimity for a finding that her actions did not take place within 1,000 feet of the school bus route stop. The Supreme Court, with Justice Susan Owens writing, agreed, and held that the jury instruction error justified reversing the sentence enhancements. The case was remanded to trial court for further proceedings. Chief Justice Barbara Madsen dissented.
Waples v. Yi, No. 82142-9 (briefs and argument) (consolidated with Cunningham v. Nicol, No. 82973-0) – The Supreme Court invalidated the requirement that plaintiffs give a 90-day notice before suing health care providers for malpractice. Nancy Waples brought a negligence action against her dentist, Peter Yi, alleging the dentist's employee injured her by negligently injecting anesthetic. The Pierce County Superior Court, and the Court of Appeals (Div. II) affirmed the dismissal, ruling the patient failed to comply with a statutory notice requirement, which required a plaintiff to provide health care providers with 90 days’ notice of the plaintiff’s intention to file a medical malpractice suit. Waples argues the notice requirement is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers. Justice Charles Johnson wrote the majority opinion, holding that court rules govern the commencement of a lawsuit. “If a statute and a court rule cannot be harmonized, the court rule will generally prevail in procedural matters and the statute in substantive matters.” Justice James Johnson dissented, arguing that the 90-day rule did not modify court rules, but merely provided parties with an incentive to settle cases rather than going to court.
